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Coerced Donation of Body Tissues:
Can We Live with McFall v. Shimp?
McFall v. Shimp,1 a case of first impression in any court, was an
equitable action seeking an order compelling defendant to "donate 2 bone
marrow for transplantation to petitioner, terminally ill with anemia. In
denying petitioner's request, Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court Judge
John Flaherty succinctly stated the conflict: "Morally, this decision rests
with the defendant, and, in the view of this court, the refusal of the
defendant is morally indefensible. [But,] for our law to compel the
defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every
concept and principle upon which our society is founded. 3
The case dramatically illustrates the nature of the problems arising
from the rapidly expanding interface of law and medicine. That interface
has in recent years been the spawning ground for an increasing amount of
litigation in which the courts are asked to take an active and discomforting
role in the delivery of health care. The strikingly dissimilar orientations of
the legal and medical professions are most evident in their respective views
regarding the fundamental nature of man-a crucial issue underlying
medico-legal litigation of this type. Medicine, to the extent it is a science,
views the human organism as a machine-a machine to be pushed to its
limits and fixed when it breaks. Law, to the extent it is grounded in
philosophy, views man as a collection of rights and interests in continual
conflict with other men and society at large. This difference in orientation
clearly emerged from McFall. The court made the ultimate decision:
whether McFall would live or die. The presence of sophisticated medical
technology cast that decision less starkly, but fundamentally, life or death
was the urgent4 issue that confronted counsel and the court.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the treatment of legal
issues centering around complex medical technology can be dispassionate
and reasoned, giving full weight to the rights and interests of all parties
concerned. This approach, familiar to the legal community in all other
contexts, is the only means by which justice can be accomplished between
1. No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July 26,1978).The author would like to
thank Judge John P. Flaherty, Jr., for providing him with copies of the briefs and opinion in the case.
2. While "donate" and "donee" imply the existence of donative intent, obviously not present in
McFall, the terms will be used interchangeably to identify the acts and persons to which they usually
refer in transplant situations.
3. No. 78-17711 at 2 [emphasis in original].
4. The complaint and a request for a preliminary injunction (compelling defendant to undergo
further testing) were presented to Judge Flaherty on July 24, 1978. A hearing on the injunction was held
July 25, and an opinion issued July 26.
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parties without unleashing the potential for a brave new world of
technocrats. 5
After setting forth the facts of McFall v. Shimp and identifying the
issues, the writer will offer an analytic construct that both allows for
judicial relief in cases analogous to McFall and preserves the "central role
of the physician" 6 in the sphere of health care. The construct will be
examined in light of relevant legal doctrines to determine whether the
result in McFall was simply an application of existing law or was
mandated by "every concept and principle upon which our society is
founded. 7
I. McFall v. Shimp: FACTS AND HOLDINGS
Robert McFall, thirty-nine, suffered from aplastic anemia, a disease
in which the patient's bone marrow produces an inadequate supply of
certain blood components.8 His condition was preliminarily diagnosed on
June 22, 1978,9 and a search was begun for potential bone marrow donors,
a bone marrow transplant being the preferred treatment for severe
manifestations of the disease.
While transplantation of body tissues is a rapidly developing science,
its progress is substantially impaired by the presence of the so-called
"rejection barrier."' ° "Rejection" is the term used to describe the process in
which the recipient's immunological system attacks the transplanted tissue
in the same way that it attacks invading bacteria. The immunological
system operates by way of genetic discrimination, attacking only those
substances that do not match the genetic composition of the host body
cells. Thus, the greater the genetic differences between the donor and the
donee, the more likely and the greater the severity of the immunological
response to the graft.1" The degree of similarity between the donor and
donee is expressed in terms of "compatibility" between the two persons. 12
5. The reference is, of course, to Aldous Huxley's classic novel. See Vukowich, Vie Dawning of
the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189 (1971).
6. Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 681 (1979).
7. No. 78-17711 at 2.
8. Record at 18-19, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa, July
26, 1978). Citations to the record of the McFall case refer to the proceedings of July 25, 1978, at which
the court heard brief oral arguments and the testimony of Dr. Pietragallo, Mr. McFall's attending
hematologist. A copy of the record has been deposited with the Ohio Statl University College of Law
Library.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Recent medical developments indicate that it may be possible to reduce the rejection barrier
significantly. If the degree of compatibility required of donors decreases, the occasions for McFall-typo
action will decrease proportionately. See Tilney, Strom, Vineyard & Merrill, Factors Contributing to
the Declining Mortality Rate in Renal Transplantation, 299 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1321 (1978).
11. Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS,
CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOsIuM 78, 78 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor eds, 1966) thereinafter cited
as CIBA SYMPOSiUM]. See also GRADWOHL'S LEGAL MEDICINE 466 (3d ed. F. Camps cd. 1976).
12. This article discusses transplantation between human beings (homotransplantation); there
are, however, procedures using animal donors (heterotransplantation).
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The most likely source of an acceptable compatible donor is the pool
of the patient's siblings. Mr. McFall had six, three brothers and three
sisters. All were tested, but none was sufficiently compatible.' 3 The search
then extended to collateral relatives and eventually led to McFall's first
cousin, David Shimp, a forty-three-year-old crane operator.1
4
When first approached about the possibility of donating bone
marrow, Mr. Shimp agreed to undergo compatibility testing at the
University of Pittsburgh's hospital facilities. The results of the initial test
indicated a high degree of compatibility between the two men. 15 An
appointment was then scheduled to conduct a final test to confirm that Mr.
Shimp was a compatible donor.' 6 Mr. Shimp failed to appear for his
appointment, stating in a later interview that his wife had asked him not to
proceed.' 7 When Mr. McFall heard that his cousin had failed to appear at
his scheduled appointment and presumably would refuse to schedule
another, McFall turned in desperation to his attorney and ultimately to the
court.'
8
The action was brought seeking a preliminary injunction ordering
Shimp to submit to the mixed lymphocyte culture, and, if the results of that
test indicated acceptable compatibility, an order compelling the donation
of bone marrow for transplantation.' 9 The entire course of the litigation
lasted only three days, ending with Judge Flaherty's refusal to issue the
preliminary injunction. 0
Admitting that there existed no firm precedent, plaintiff argued that
"several critical factors which are the touchstones of justice, i.e. ethics,
morality and custom, as well as the best thinking of legal scholars and the
13. Bad Samaritan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 35 [hereinafter cited as Bad Samaritan].
14. Id.
15. Record at 25, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July
26, 1978). This test, termed a histocompatibility lymphocyte antigen (H LA) test, compares the genetic
characteristics of the number six chromosome, which apparently stimulates the antigenic reaction that
underlies rejection. Id. at 23.
16. In this test, a mixed lymphocyte culture, 50 cc. of blood drawn from the prospective donor
are mixed with blood from the prospective donee to determine the degree of reactivity between the
respective lymphocytes. Id. at 32.
17. Bad Samaritan, supra note 13, at 35.
18. McFall engaged his attorney on the Thursday following the missed appointment, July 20,
1978, and suit was filed the following Monday, July 24. Record at4, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In
Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July 26, 1978). The reason for this haste was that time was
becoming critical Candidates for bone marrow transplants need transfusions to maintain missing
blood components during the period of the search, but are transfused as infrequently as possible
because the introduction of foreign blood hypersensitizes those patients to grafts. Id. at 22.
19. The donation procedure was described by Dr. Pietragallo as the insertion ofa curved needle
into the iliac bones of the donor and the aspiration of approximately 5 cc. of marrow. Since at least 500
cc. are required, over 100 such taps would have to be performed on the donor. The physician described
the risks to the donor, who would be placed undergeneral anesthesia, as"veryacceptable." Id. at38-39,
44-45.
20. See note 4 supra. while the denial of the injunction did not end the case, further litigation
would have been fruitless.
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dicta of our courts compel the result sought. .. ,,2' He cited a case22 in
which a Louisiana court had refused to approve the donation of a kidney
by a mentally incompetent minor to his ailing sister, arguing that the
criteria articulated by the Louisiana court were satisfied in this case.23 He
listed examples of permissible intrusions into bodily security, including
criminal searches and seizures, vaccinations, and civil blood tests.
24
Plaintiff spoke of the powers of equity, citing to the court the Second
Statute of Westminster,25 the source of the powers invested in chancery
courts, of which, it was argued, the Pennsylvania court was a descendant.
26
Plaintiff acknowledged that defendant must be under a duty to act, citing
two cases that appeared to support the existence of this duty2 7 and offering
the views of commentators that, if this duty did not exist at common law, it
should be established in light of prevailing principles of law and justice.2"
His arguments ended with a plea:
The time for study is over. The exigencies require action in order to save a
human life. Our noblest traditions as a free people and our common sense of
decency, society and morality all point to the proper result in this case. We
respectfully suggest that it is time our law did likewise.29
21. Brief for Plaintiff at 2, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978).
22. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1973). Plaintiff's reliance on this case was
misplaced, however, because the doctrine urged in Richardson required the court to place itself in the
position of the potential donor, who was unable to consent due to his disabilities, and substitute its
judgment for his. This doctrine was first applied to transplantation in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 SW.2d 145
(Ky. 1968), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court approved the transplantation of an incompetent's
kidney to his dying brother.
In 1957 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed three minor children to donate
kidneys to their identical twin siblings, but these unreported cases were decided on traditional
principles of parental consent, rather than the "substituted judgment" doctrine announced by the court
in Strunk. The cases are discussed in Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation In
Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 891 (1959). See also Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A,2d 386
(1972), in which the court synthesized the doctrines of the Massachusetts cases and Strunk to grant
permission for a minor to donate a kidney to his twin.
23. Brief for Plaintiff at 2, MeFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978).
24. Id. at 3.
25.
Whensoever from thenceforth a writ shall be found in the Chancery, and in a like case
falling under the same right and requiring a like remedy, no precedent of a writ can be
produced, the Clerks in Chancery shall agree in forming a new one; lest it happen for the
future that the court of our lord the king be deficient in doing justice to the suitors.
St. Westminster 2, 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 24.
26. Brief for Plaintiff at 4, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978).
27. Id. at 5, citing Hutchinson v. Diekie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947), and Farwell v. Keaton, 396
Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976). The cases are distinguishable from McFall in that the courts
imposed a duty to rescue because of the relationship between the parties. Hutchinson dealt with a boat
owner and his guest; Farwell dealt with two social companions on a drinking spree, a "special
relationship" in which the court found an "implicit ...understanding that one will render assistance
to the other ...." Farwell, 396 Mich. at 291, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
28. Brief for Plaintiff at 5-8, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity(C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978), citing Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. Rav. 97 (1908); Dawson, Negotiorum
Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1073 (1961); Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A
Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965); Note, he Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52
COL. L. REV. 631 (1952).
29. Brief for Plaintiff at 8, MeFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978).
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Defendant relied on two basic arguments: that he owed plaintiff no
legal duty and that both the federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions
protected his privacy as an individual. In support of his "no duty"
argument, defendant cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 30 that had
adopted section 314 of the Restatement of Torts. Section 314 provides that
"[t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon
him a duty to take such action."3 ' After quoting Pennsylvania s
constitutional guarantees of the natural rights of its citizens, 32 defendant
admonished:
Defendant's right to himself [choose] whether his body will be invaded forthe
benefit of another is fundamental and beyond question. The decision of
whether to be a donor is that of the Defendant and the Defendant alone. No"
individual and, it is most respectfully submitted, no court ought to attempt to
abrogate this "inherent and indefeasible right. ' 33
In denying the preliminary injunction, Judge Flaherty refused to
recognize a duty on the part of the defendant to come to the rescue of the
plaintiff. While admitting that the rule "on the surface, appears to be
revolting in a moral sense, 34 the judge felt that the lack of a duty was
justified by principles comprising the "very essence of our . .. society. 35
Noting that plaintiff's brief contained references to the existence of the
duty in other countries,36 the judge stated that "[o]ur society, contrary to
many others, has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, and
that society and government exist to protect the individual from being
invaded and hurt by another. 3 7 He expressed concern about the effects of
recognizing such a duty in the situation before him in which a significant
intrusion upon the person of the defendant was requested, and stated: "To
do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule
which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line
would be drawn. 3 8 His reticence stemmed in part from his awareness of
the special significance of the nature of the relief sought:
This request is not to be compared with an action at law for damages, but
rather is an action in equity before a Chancellor, which, in the ultimate, if
granted, would require the forceable submission to the medical procedure.
For a society, which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into
30. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316,155 A.2d 343 (1959), cited in Brieffor Defcndantat2, McFallv.
Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July26,1978). See note73 !nfraforDean
Prosser's assessment of this decision.
31. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
32. PA. CONSr. art 1, § 1.
33. Brief for Defendant at 4, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity(C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26. 1978).
34. No. 78-17711 at 2.
35. Id.
36. Brief for Plaintiffat 5-6, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity(C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978). See also text accompanying notes 93-105 infra.
37. No. 78-17711 at 2.
38. Id.
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the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts ofjurisprudence.
Forceable extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial
mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition,
reminiscent of the horrors this portends. 39
Thus ended the case of McFall v. Shimp. 40
Robert McFall died on August 10, 1978. 4' The analytic construct that
follows suggests a more satisfactory method to deal with events such as
those that led to McFall v. Shimp. It is intended to achieve, admittedly
through coercive means, a minimum level of common decency and
humanity as an element of the social contract.42
II. THE CONSTRUCT
The fundamental nature of the rights asserted by both litigants in
McFall v. Shimp demands that any analytic resolution of the conflict
between those rights acknowledge the broader implications of the
analysis. The construct that follows is offered to guide this analysis and to
stimulate legislative consideration.
The construct envisions an equitable action initiated by the
plaintiff/ patient, praying for an order compelling the defendant/ donor to
cooperate in the transplantation procedure. The plaintiff is required to
show satisfaction of four criteria, all related to the efficacy of the proposed
treatment and the risk to the donor. This showing is made by using
scientific data of independent significance, generally in the form of surveys,
reports and statistical compilations, and expert medical opinion evidence.
The court engages in a two-step process to determine whether the plaintiff
is entitled to relief. The court first determines whether the plaintiff has
carried his burden of producing evidence of satisfaction of all the criteria.
The court then undertakes a balancing test to determine whether the
anticipated benefit of the treatment justifies the intrusion and risks to the
donor. If the court finds it warranted, an order issues directing the
defendant/donor to cooperate in the proposed transplant procedure. A
defendant who does not comply with the order subjects himself to
contempt proceedings and possible criminal and civil liability.
The construct operates within a distinct set of situations. Transplanta-
tion therapy has been clearly identified as the preferred treatment for
diseases of various tissues and organs. 43 Significantly, in no other form of
39. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
40. See note 20 supra.
41. The Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1978, at A-10, col. 1.
42. The term "social contract" is used here in a general sense to evoke the bond that forms the
basis of all civilized societies. It partakes of, but does not totally incorpol ate, the philosophy expressed
by J. Rousseau in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (American ed. 1950) (France 1762).
43. As of 1974, the following tissues and organs were transplantable with varying degrees of
success: cornea, teeth, thymus gland, lung, heart, liver, pancreas, kidney, intestine, blood vessels, bone,
bone marrow, skin, and tendons. J. DEATON, NEw PARTS FOR OLD 16 (1974).
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medical treatment is the cooperation of another person-the donor-a
prerequisite to the treatment's implementation or success.
As transplantation treatment becomes more common, the likelihood
increases that individuals whose cooperation is vital will refuse to
participate. It is to this problem that the construct and analysis are
addressed. The issue is whether the law should be responsive to the plight
of the patient and, if it should, what response is justified by principles of
law and social policy.
The construct is also offered as a stimulus for legislative action.
Legislation in accord with the policy and safeguards embodied in the
construct would contribute toward achieving substantial justice in this
area. This writer hopes that the construct and analysis will stimulate
thoughtful debate among members of the legal, medical, philosophical,
theological, and sociological communities. Each of these disciplines has
much to contribute to the resolution of issues presented in the exploration
of the juncture of law and morals. It is especially important that the
medical community participate in the deliberations, since the decisions to
be made in these cases are essentially medical in nature with the law and the
courts providing the power to effectuate them.
The construct provides a basic framework for resolution of cases that
arise when an afflicted plaintiff/ patient is denied necessary transplantative
therapy by the refusal of the defendant/ donor to cooperate in the effort. In
the discussion that follows, the facts and part of the record of McFallare
used to illustrate the type of evidence to be introduced and decisions to be
made. Procedural and substantive requirements are incorporated to
restrict the operative scope of the construct to situations for which a
sound policy foundation and supporting legal doctrine can be clearly
articulated.
A. Criteria
Before the construct may be invoked, the situation of the plaintiff
must be sufficiently grave to give rise to a "compelling" state interest in the
protection and preservation of his life.44 In effect, the plaintiff's illness
must have reached such a critical stage that, without effective state
intervention, he will almost certainly die. The following criteria are
proposed to identify and define that stage.45
To obtain relief, the plaintiff must show satisfaction of four criteria:
(1) that he is in imminent danger of dying from a disease that can be treated
by transplantation of an organ, tissue, or fluid from another; (2) that he
44. See text accompanying notes 153-57 infra.
45. In an attempt to remain within the confines of the issues raised by McFall, the writer
considers only criteria that apply to diseases for which the desired relief is ultimately transplantation.
There may or may not be other situations in which the same considerations would have to be
recognized to fashion relief for a plaintiff suffering from a disease. The discussion demonstrates the
types of issues and evidence that will increasingly confront the courts.
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
stands to experience substantial benefit from such a transplant with the
defendant serving as donor; (3) that transplantation from the defendant is
the exclusive mode of treatment that offers the prospect of substantial
benefit to the plaintiff; and (4) that the organ, tissue, or fluid sought is
expendable by the donor-given the quantity of tissue or fluid to be
removed and its regenerative capacity-and that the removal of the organ,
tissue, or fluid will not result in disfigurement.46
Under the construct, the plaintiff must allege and prove facts that
satisfy these criteria. After the submission of all the evidence-the
plaintiff's, the defendant's, the court's-the decisionmaker deter-
mines whether, according to the definitions of the terms italicized above,
47
the plaintiff has satisfied all four criteria. If this threshold determination is
favorable to the plaintiff, the decisionmaker proceeds to balance the
respective strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiff's case, in effect
balancing the benefit to the plaintiff against the risks to the defendant.
Minimum levels of consistency and precision are accomplished by
requiring minimum showings for eachof the criteria, which must be met or
exceeded to permit the court to proceed to the balancing process. These
minimum showings set the limits within which the operation of the
construct may be supposed to significantly advance a legitimate policy
objective.
I. Imminence
The imminence of the plaintiff's death could be proved by two types
of evidence. The first takes the form of medical opinion evidence regarding
the plaintiff's chance of survival without the transplant. In McFall, for
example, plaintiff's expert witness testified to his opinion that MeFall had
a twenty to twenty-five percent chance of surviving one year without the
bone marrow transplant.48 The second consists of statistical compilations
corroborative of the expert witnesses' testimony. This evidence should
concentrate on case histories of other patients suffering from the disease. If
the disease is one that manifests itself in differing degrees of severity, the
evidence should concentrate on those patients whose conditions were
similar to the plaintiff's. 9 Since it seems unlikely that the state can show a
46. Obviously, all surgical procedures result in some degree of disfigurement. This criterion
refers to a disfigurement beyond that normally associated with a surgical procedure involving the
organ, tissue, or fluid.
47. The terms are here defined as a means of setting bounds within which theconstruct operates
for purposes of this Case Comment. Were these criteria to be embodied in legislation, however, the
definitions would need to be tailored to allow courts flexibility in the balancing process described in the
text. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
48. Record at 40, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July
26, 1978). The fact that this 20-25% chance eventually translated into 17 days indicates the unreliability
of these predictions. Since, however, the "science" of medicine is generally imprecise, all available data
and opinions should be presented, and the court should accord to each its proper weight in the
decisionmaking process.
49. Dr. Pietragallo testified in McFall that the transplant centers had developed rather strict
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compelling interest in the life of a patient whose unassisted survival
chances are greater than fifty percent, the plaintiff's minimum showing on
this criterion is that his chances of survival, absent the transplant, are less
than fifty percent.5 0
2. Substantial Benefit
Statistical and expert opinion evidence could be used in the same
manner to show the prospect of a substantial benefit accruing to the
plaintiff if the transplant is performed. The existence of a benefit is
determined by comparing the projected survival chances of the plaintiff
with and without the transplant. The determination of the substantiality of
that benefit is a two-stage process. First, a plaintiff who is unable t6 show
that the transplant will make it more likely than not that he will survive an
additional two years is not entitled to relief. A lesser probability of benefit
will not justify invasion of the defendant's fundamental rights to bodily
integrity. While this requirement might be easily met by plaintiffs whose
unassisted survival chances were slightly less than fifty percent, the
requirement that the court balance the efficacy of the proposed treatment
against the risks to the donor requires a very strong showing by these
plaintiffs in the second stage of the substantiality test.5'
Second, the amount of the increase in the chance of survival is
examined. In this stage of the case, the plaintiff must show that he is at least
twenty-five percent more likely to s.rvive with the transplant than without
it. McFall provides an excellent example. His post-transplant survival
chances were forty to sixty percent; 52 his chances for unassisted survival,
twenty to twenty-five percent. Thus the potential benefit of the transplant
to McFall was between fifteen and forty percent. If the court had found the
forty percent chance of survival with the transplant more likely, McFall
criteria for the characterization of a patient's condition as "severe," and noted that McFall met all of
them. He went on "The survival [chance] is by no means uniformly fatal. There are some patients who
live on with this disease. It's asmall number when the disease is severe." Record at20, McFall v. Shimp,
No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July 26, 1978). Presumably, survival statistics
could be obtained for most diseases remediable by transplantation.
50. Due to the deteriorating nature of these diseases, it is likely that the plaintiff's chances will
decrease as time passes. If the court sees this as a real possibility in a case in which the unassisted
survival chance is greater than 50%, but believes that it is likely that the plaintiff's showing on the other
criteria will remain satisfactory, the court should be empowered to stay the action and retain
jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court should realize that continued and repeated proceedings
may allow the plaintiff to harass the defendant, and should take all steps necessary to guard against
such conduct.
51. Note, however, that if the risks to thedefendant arenegligible, as indonatingapint of blood,
the plaintiff's burden of proving substantial benefit is greatly reduced.
52. The doctor predicted the probable success as "forty to sixty percent, probably fifty percent
would be a reasonable estimate." Record at 45, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P.
Allegheny County, Pa. July 26, 1978). The 40-60% range is used in the text because of its illustrative
value. The testimony is important to note, however, because if the doctor actually did decide on 50M,
McFall would be out of court because he could not satisfy the minimum requirement for the criterion.
In this type of proceeding testimony should be as precise as possible while still reflecting the true and
valid opinion of the witness.
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would have lost under this construct for two reasons. First, the maximum
probability of his survival with the transplant would riot have been greater
than fifty percent. Second, his showing of a fifteen to twenty percent
increase in survival chances would have been inadequate to satisfy the
substantial increase requirement. If, however, the court had found that
there was a sixty percent chance that McFall would survive with the
transplant, McFall would have satisfied the minimum showing re-
quirements of both stages of the substantiality test. With the transplant his
survival would have been more likely than not, and he would have stood to
experience a thirty-five to forty percent increase in his survival chances.
3. Exclusivity
The plaintiff's most difficult task is a two-step showing that a
transplant from the defendant is the exclusive mode of treatment that
offers a substantial benefit. First, the plaintiff must show that a diligent
search has failed to produce an alternative willing donor.53 The plaintiff
cannot be expected to have tested every person in the nation, and the court
must recognize that time is crucial. As time passes, the prospect of
substantial benefit will likely decrease. The plaintiff ought not be denied
relief by default.
Second, the plaintiff must show that other means of treatment are not
available.54 The alleged availability of other means should be closely
scrutinized by the court, and only those that are demonstrably effective
should be considered. The court should inquire whether such non-
transplantative treatments are sufficiently beneficial that the plaintiff
should be relegated to them.
4. Expendability
The final criterion, that the tissue be expendable by the defendant, can
53. Shimp's counsel raised this issue at the hearing. Id. at 41. He asked whether all of MeFall's
relatives of the second degree had been tested, but Dr. Pietragallo was unable to answer. Certainly,
under the proposal, all the immediate family must have been tested, but it is for the court to decide
whether, in light of time constraints and availability of relatives, testing must have been carried out to a
specific degree of collateral relationship.
In the event that there is another unwilling donor of similarly acceptable compatibility, the
defendant is entitled to implead the other person provided he can show that there is a substantial
likelihood that the person to be impleaded would be as acceptable or superior to the defendant as a
donor. For example, if the plaintiffwere one of a set of identical triplets and the defendant another, the
defendant would likely be able to implead the third sibling. While the genetic identity of the three would
yield theoretically "perfect" matches, the presence of antibodies produced during previous illnesses or
present disease might decrease the benefit or increase the risk to one, allowing a valid distinction to be
made.
54. Mr. Shimp's counsel also raised this issue at the hearing. Id. Apparently, a chemical agent
had been used in the treatment of aplastic anemia, but Dr. Pietragallo described it as "only a second
choice" and "experimental." As pointed out in the text, the fact that it would be "only a second choice"
should not be determinative; if it is truly experimental, however, its consideration as an alternative
should be precluded. Just as a defendant should not be forced to submit to experimental techniques, a
plaintiff should not be required to be a guinea pig when a proven means of saving his life exists,
In some courses of treatment, chemotherapy and irradiation are conjunctive measures of
treatment to transplantation. In these cases, the court would assume this conjunctive course, and the
evidence would relate to the effect of the transplant portion of the treatment.
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be specificially defined. Unquestionably, the plaintiff cannot demand the
defendant's heart, although heart transplantation is possible.55 Other
organs, for example kidneys, lungs, and skin, are more difficult to
characterize. These organs are all transplantable, but their proposed
transplantation in this context engenders feelings of substantial outrage.
Removal of a single kidney or lung from a donor who has a pair is usually
not life-threatening but does impair an important "back-up system." Skin
grafting procedures are likely to produce severe disfiguration. Thus, paired
vital organs might rationally be excluded from the operation of the
construct but skin might be included if appropriate site and area
restrictions were placed on its compelled donation.
5. Balancing Process
If the plaintiff satisfies these four criteria, the court moves to its
greatest challenge under the construct-balancing the benefits shown as
likely to accrue to the plaintiff against the risks to the defendant in acting as
donor. As with the criteria, statistical and opinion evidence should be used
to establish the risks imposed on the defendant by the donation
procedure.56 The inquiry is not confined to probabilities of death or
disability. The court should feel free to examine more subtle con-
siderations as well. The defendant's possible pain and suffering should be
considered,57 as should the family and occupational responsibilities with
which he is charged.5 8 Against these risks to the defendant are weighed the
benefits to the plaintiff as established under the criteria.
As noted at the outset, the rights involved in these cases are
fundamental and worthy of zealous protection. Therefore, the procedural
framework under which this construct would operate is of critical
importance. The plaintiff requires maximum efficiency to preclude defeat
of his action by progressive physical deterioration and the defendant
requires maximal protection of his rights and interests during the entire
course of the proceedings. The next section suggests certain fundamental
procedural safeguards that should be incorporated into this construct.
55. The first successful heart transplant was performed by Dr. Christiaan Barnard of
Johannesburg, South Africa, on December 3, 1967. R. PoRzio, Tim TRANSPLA.'Tr AGE 17 (1969).
56. Donor risks are apparently quantifiable with some precision. Dr. Hamburger, of the
University of Paris, has determined the risks to a kidney donor to be 0.12%. Discussion.
Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, CIBA SymPosium, supra note 11, at 19. This appraisal is
supported by the observation that of the 3000 live donor kidney transplants reported as of 1972, only
one had resulted in the death of the donor. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368,373,289 A.2d 386,389
(1972). It is also significant that life insurance companies do not rate people who have undergone
nephrectomy (removal of a kidney) as a higher risk than people with two kidneys. General Discussion.
CIBA SYMPosIuM, supra note 11, at 163.
57. One hundred taps into the iliac crest, the procedure for a bone marrow transplant, can be
excruciatingly painful during the post-operative period.
58. For example. a certain degree of risk of partial loss of back strength may be acceptable to a
single person whose job is basically sedentary, but may not be acceptable to a family breadwinner
whose employment requires heavy lifting.
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B. Procedural Requirements
The action is commenced by filing a petition for an order directing the
defendant to submit to the necessary procedures for donation. The highest
court in the state has original and exclusive jurisdiction. 59 Process, served
on the defendant personally, includes a detailed statement of the unique
rights accorded a defendant in this type of action.60
The petition must set forth with particularity a prima facie showing by
the plaintiff that his circumstances satisfy the criteria set out above. Any
request for additional information from the defendant must be included at
this time. 6' As far as possible, all statements and allegations in the petition
must be corroborated by attached affidavits of the attending physicians,
making reference to and submitting as exhibits any relevant laboratory test
results.
The pretrial period should be kept to the minimum necessary to allow
the defendant to prepare his case. The court must guard against
harassment of the plaintiff at this stage. Cooperation of the plaintiff should
present no obstacles, as it is in his interest that the action move as quickly
as possible.
The court appoints its own experts to supplement the testimony of the
parties' witnesses. These experts should be as objective as possible without
sacrificing the quality of their opinions.62 The plaintiff may be required to
submit to a reasonable medical examination by both the court's and the
defendant's medical experts.63
If the plaintiff is able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
his satisfaction of all four criteria, and the court finds that the risks to the
defendant/donor are greatly outweighted by the benefits to the
59. There are two reasons for giving original jurisdiction to the state's highest court. The first is
time; by their very nature, diseases amenable to treatment by transplantation require accelerated
procedures. Second, members of the highest court are highly respectedjtrists who can be relied on for a
just determination.
60. Service of process should be nationwide. Congress might act to provide for service similar to
that authorized for interpleader in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976). Alternatively, service of
process could be effected under a state long-arm statute on the grounds that the defendant's refusal to
cooperate is a tort committed within the state.
61. The McFall case was perhaps unique in that the defendant had already undergone one test
that indicated the likelihood of being a compatible donor. In most such cases the defendant probably
would refuse to cooperate from the start, and the plaintiff would request a preliminary injunction
ordering the defendant to undergo initial compatibility testing. To avoid "fishing expeditions," the
plaintiff should be required to introduce evidence of the statistical probability of obtaining acceptable
results from the testing. Because compatibility is probable only among family members and because
the requested invasion is relatively minor, the injunction should be granted if there is a reasonable
probability of compatibility.
62. The quality of opinion should be the highest practicably obtainable. This issue arose at the
hearing in McFall. Dr. Pietragallo's testimony was repeatedly objected to on grounds of hearsay and
lack of qualifications as an expert since he had not personally performed a bone marrow transplant or
mixed lymphocyte culture. Record at 13,15,29 and 36, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P,
Allegheny County, Pa. July 26, 1978). The objections were overruled by Judge Flaherty, probably a
fair result in light of the short period available for preparation.
63. A "reasonable medical evaluation" should not be construed to include a searching
examination by the defendant's examining witness. Unless a significant question exists regarding the
validity of the medical data presented by the plaintiff to substantiate his condition, it should be
sufficient for the defense to attack the interpretation of those data, not their veracity.
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plaintiff/patient, an order should issue. The significance of this order is
twofold. First, it provides a basis upon which the court itself can act to
coerce the compliance of the defendant. Second, it serves as a judicial
recognition of the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff. This duty can later serve as the basis for either a private civil
action by the plaintiff or his survivors or a criminal prosecution. The first
aspect of the order is of considerably greater importance than the second,
however, since compliance with the order is the only means by which the
plaintiff's life can be saved. Preservation of life is the principal goal of the
construct and should be vigorously pursued. Possible methods of
achieving this goal despite the donor's reluctance are set out in the next
section.
C. Sanctions
Compliance might be obtained through the court's inherent powers of
civil contempt.64 A noncomplying defendant could be fined or im-
prisoned65 until he complied or until his compliance would no longer be
effectual. 66 Imprisonment, which is only available as a contempt sanction
during the period in which the defendant could act in accord with the
dictates of the order, should be the choice of the court attempting to secure
compliance. The most coercive powers consistent with due process should
be brought to bear upon a noncomplying defendant immediately.
Subsequent civil action is available to provide appropriate compensation
or to impose punitive damages.
Criminal sanctions could also be imposed for noncompliance. In most
states the defendant could at least be found guilty of manslaughter for
failing to carry out a duty imposed by law. In view of the wilful nature of
the noncompliance, the defendant might even be prosecuted for
premeditated and deliberate murder.6 7 While these sanctions may seem
severe, their efficacy as a coercive means of ensuring compliance can hardly
be questioned.68 It is important to remember that the ultimate goal is
64. "There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their
lawful orders through civil contempt." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
65.
Where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is "intended to be remedial by
coercing defendant to do what he had refused to do," . . . the remedy is one for civil
contempt. ... Fine and imprisonment are then employed not to vindicate the public
interest but as coercivesanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his duty
to do.
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947) (citations omitted).
66. Certainly, if the plaintiff died, the contempt citation would have to be lifted since the
defendant would no longer"hold the keys to his cell." Whether he would be entitled toa hearing while
the plaintiffwas still alive to determine whether his compliance would still be required under the criteria
of the statute would be a matter for the legislature or the court's discretion.
67. For purposes of their criminal codes, most states define "act" to include omissions when the
offender is under a legally cognizable duty to act. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.00(3),(5) (McKinney
1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (Page 1974); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 103 (Purdon 1973).
68. See text accompanying notes 93-105 infra for examples of foreign enactments imposing
criminal sanctions on one who fails to aid another in peril.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ensuring compliance. Competing considerations might, however, justify
the creation of a lesser offense in cases of this type.
D. Costs
The plaintiff is responsible for all costs associated with the defendant's
donation including medication, therapy, and any medical examinations
necessitated by the procedure. The plaintiff is also liable for any injury
occasioned by the donation, even if that injury is not normally associated
with the procedure.6 9 The payments by the plaintiff might also be
supplemented by a state-funded compensation scheme modeled after
workmen's compensation systems that would provide benefits to the donor
or to his dependents should he unexpectedly become disabled or lose his
life as a result of the donation.
III. THE LEGAL DOCTRINES
In McFall, two legal issues required resolution: first, whether there
was a duty on the part of Shimp to come to the rescue of McFall and,
second, if that duty were established, whether its enforcement in the
circumstances of that case would so infringe upon Shimp's right to bodily
security that constitutional limitations on state action would be exceeded.
The writer will now examine jurisprudential and constitutional aspects of
these issues in the context of the foregoing construct.
A. Jurisprudential Perspectives
The common law provides that one has no duty to come to the aid of
another in peril.70  The periodical literature brims with scholarly
dissertations decrying the inhumanity of this rule.7' Some courts have
illustrated the heinousness of the rule with bizarre tales of fiction,72 yet
most have dutifully applied it to equally bizarre sets of facts."
69. Injuries resulting from malpractice on the part of the physicians involved in the donation or
ancillary procedures, however, are not the responsibility of the plaintiff and arc recoverable only
through a malpractice action against those physicians.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs,TIlE LAW ovToRTs
§ 18.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
71. See THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (J. Ratcliffe cd. 1966) [hereinafter cited as TIll
GOOD SAMARITAN]; Ames, supra note 28; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basisfor Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217,316 (1908); Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, andNon-feasance,
46 COL. L. REV. 196 (1946); Minor, The Moral Obligation as a Basis of Liability, 9 VA. L. REV. 420
(1923).
72.
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track, and a car
approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless
savage and a moral monster, but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or indictable
under the statute for its death.
Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1898).
73. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. AOD. 541, 151 S.E.2d 905 (1966) (no duty to rescue child
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The criticism has apparently not gone unnoticed; the law has come to
mitigate some of the harsher results arising from a strict application of the
rule. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, while maintaining
that there is no general duty to rescue,74 contains two sections75 in which an
affirmative obligation to act for the benefit of another in peril is imposed
upon certain classes of persons with respect to another class.
The duty stems from a special relationship between the parties, a
relationship that courts have recognized as giving rise to a "special
responsibility ' 76 on the part of one of them. These exceptions to the
general rule, however, are quite limited in their scope and seem designed to
exact a price from those engaged in commerce and enterprise 7 rather than
to enforce a moral duty.
78
Historically, the nonrecognition of a duty to rescue turns on the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. The early common law
courts, attempting to maintain some semblance of order in the
countryside, "were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of
misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing,
even though another might suffer harm because of his omission to act.," 9
Several justifications have been offered for the perpetuation of the rule.
Some are grounded in practicality, others in social and political
philosophy.
From a practical standpoint, objectors to the imposition of a duty to
rescue argue a lack of precision in the determination of liability, an
inability to tailor the rule to allow for human frailties, and the probability
of increasing congestion in the courts. Dean Prosser, as reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, offered as one explanation for the
nonexistence of a duty to rescue "the difficulty of singling out the
individual who is to be forced to give help, and held liable if he does not. A
man is starving to death in the middle of a city, and no one feeds him.
licensee drowning in swimming pool); Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928) (proprietor
of canoe rental service had no duty to rescue intoxicated patron whose canoe tipped over); Yania v.
Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (no duty to rescue business invitee who, at defendant's
instance, jumped into a water-filled trench and drowned). "It would be hard to find a trio of more
unappetizing decisions." PROSSER, supra note 70, § 56, at 340 n.60.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 314B (1965). Neither section appeared in the
original Restatement of Torts. Section 314B substantially duplicated RESTATEwEr',T OF AGENCY § 512
(1933). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 512 (1957).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, Comment b (1965).
77. For example, §§ 314A and 314B impose a duty upon common carriers to their passengers,
innkeepers to their guests, and employers to their employees.
78. Most of the commentators advocate imposition of a duty to rescue for purely moral reasons.
Professor Ames, for example, states:
It is obvious that the spirit of reform which during the last six hundred years has been
bringing our system of law more and more into harmony with moral principles has not yet
achieved its perfect work. It is worth while to realize the great ethical advance of the English
law in the past, if only as an encouragement to effort for future improvement.
Ames, supra note 28, at 113.
79. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 56 at 338.
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Whom can he sue?"' ° A correlative argument is made that there are some
situations, for instance when a child is drowning at a public beach, in which
a rush of rescuers would actually increase the danger to the imperiled as
well as to each other.81
Another practical objection is that some willing individuals may
become psychologically or physically overwhelmed by the situation and
consequently unable to help.8 It has been said that if the purpose of
imposing the duty is to encourage the "moral" behavior of aiding others in
distress, the application of the doctrine to those incapable of volitional
action in emergencies would not serve that purpose. It is further urged that
no amount of careful drafting would effectively restrict liability to those
who maliciously choose not to act, the true targets of the rule.83
The third practical objection is the possibility of a strain on the court
dockets. With Americans becoming increasingly litigious each year,84 it is
argued that society should be greatly concerned about adding yet another
weapon to the expanding arsenal of potential plaintiffs.
However convincing these arguments may prove against imposing a
general duty to rescue, they are not persuasive in reference to the construct
set forth above. The circumstances in which the construct operates are
unique. By its own terms,85 it requires that only one person be capable of
rendering the necessary aid, and that that person be identified, informed of
his position, and given a chance to refute the evidence offered by the
plaintiff.
The objections based on human frailties are inapposite to the
construct. The action demanded of the reluctant donor/rescuer is not
spontaneous. While the circumstances might be considered overwhelming,
the legal rights of the putative rescuer are scrupulously protected.
It is doubtful that docket congestion is ever a valid objection to a new
development in the law.86 It is especially inappropriate here. Cases in
80. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: PROCEEDINGS-37TH ANNUAL MEETING 171 (1960).
81. Hale, supra note 71, at 215.
82. Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L.J. 321 (1972).
83. Id. at 324-25. The author of the Note divided those persons who do not respond in tn
emergency situation into two categories, the "callous" and the"cowardly" (not in the traditional sense,
but in the sense that the presence of an emergency is debilitating). The callous, it is asserted, are the
persons at whom the duty is aimed since they deny the existence of even a moral duty to act, and, since it
is impossible to attach liability to the callous but not the cowardly, no duty should be imp osed. The flaw
in this analysis, however, lies in its premises; first, the purpose of the duty is to save lives and prevent
injuries, not to punish immoral acts or omissions; second, there is a wide range of character falling
between the two extremes proposed as all encompassing. Note the discussion of the Kitty Genovese
case in THE GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 71, at ix-x, in which 38 persons watched or listened to i
woman being murdered without even notifying the authorities. These are the types of persons at whom
the duty is directed, those who "don't want to get involved."
84. In 1960, there were 59,284 civil cases filed in federal district courts. In 1977, 130,567 civil
cases were filed-more than twice as many. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF TlE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978, at 185 (99th ed. 1978).
85. See text accompanying notes 53, 54, 59-64 supra.
86. "[C]ourts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few suits or
many; the existence of a multitude of claims merely show society's pressing need for legal redress."
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 735, 441 P.2d 912, 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 n.3 (1968),
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which a donor's refusal to participate in a transplant will trigger legal
compulsion are unlikely to occur in large numbers.
The social and political objections are less easily dealt with.
Opponents of imposing a duty to rescue might well invoke concepts of
"individualism" and "the American way," or even "socialism" or "slavery."
Regardless of the epithet, the fears embodied in such remarks are
fundamental ethical concerns that are not easily dismissed.
Professor Bohlen surmised that the original distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance came not only from the crowded conditions
of the courtrooms, but from a "primary conception of the common
law . . . regard[ing] the individual as competent to protect himself if not
interfered with from without."87 Professors Harper and James attribute
the distinction to "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, indi-
dualism."88
The "rugged individualism" of our forefathers, however, is greatly
diluted in today's complex and interdependent society. Our reverence for
individuality necessarily extends more to the cerebral than the physical,8 9
as technological constraints and resource scarcity increasingly cir-
cumscribe physical liberty.
The argument that coerced transplantation violates the constitutional
proscription of slavery and involuntary servitude is easily pierced. It is not
the "will" of the ailing donee that forces the donor/ rescuer to act, but
rather the circumstances in which the helpless donee finds himself. Aplastic
anemia, not Robert McFall's assertion of dominion, brought David
Shimp to court.
The charge that a duty to rescue is socialistic comes closer to the
mark.90 Indeed, the philosophical-as distinguished from the political-
concept of socialism may provide the soundest basis upon which to found a
duty to aid one's fellows. The concept of social conscience is not, however,
reserved to totalitarian states. The Supreme Court of Indiana, speaking
about the duty to rescue, observed that "[tlhere may be principles of social
conduct so universally recognized as to be demanded that they be observed
as a legal duty . ... ' This universal recognition stems not from a
revolutionary consciousness but rather from the Judeo-Christian ethic
that teaches its followers to "love thy neighbor."92*
A duty to rescue can be imposed without undue social, political, or
87. Bohlen, supra note 71, at 221.
88. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 70, § 18.6, at 1046.
89. This shift to the cerebral may, in fact, be a return to the essence of liberty. "This, then, is the
appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness;
demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling;
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects. .. ." J.S. Mu.L, O.N LiBEaTY II (R.
McCallum ed. 1946).
90. See Note, supra note 28, at 641.
91. L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86,93-94,40 N.E.2d 334,337 (1942) (emphasis added).
92. Indeed, one of the most-cited references in cases dealing with the duty to rescue is the parable
of the Good Samaritan, found in Luke 10:25-37. The irony is that the parable was related in response to
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judicial disruption. As noted in the plaintiff's brief in McFall,93 numerous
European countries impose civil and criminal sanctions on those who are
able to aid another in distress but do not. Germany is typical. Its criminal
code provides:
Anybody who does not render aid in accident or common danger or in an
emergency situation, although aid is needed and under the circumstances can
be expected of him, especially if he would not subject himself thereby to any
considerable danger, or if he would not thereby violate other important
duties, shall be punished by imprisonment not to exceed one year or a fine.94
In addition, Germany added a new provision to its criminal code in 1975:
Whoever fails to avoid the occurrence of a result that conforms to the
definition of an offense, is punishable under this Code if principles of right
require him to make sure that the result does not occur and if the failure to act
is [morally] equivalent to bringing about the prohibited result by affirmative
conduct. 9
The German statutes thus create a duty to act to avert danger in two types
of situations. In the first, when the danger is a fortuity, one must render aid
if the circumstances create an expectation of assistance. In the second,
when the danger is impending as the result of the perpetration of some
crime, the bystander is to act if "principles of right" require him to avert the
probable result.
The obligation of the bystander under the first statute96 is unclear. He
certainly must act if he faces no risk of "considerable danger." The
inclusion of the word "especially," however, indicates that there may be
situations in which action is required even at the risk of considerable
injury. In the second statute,97 the risks to be faced by the putative rdscuer
are apparently prescribed by the language referring to "principles of right."
Professor Feldbrugge quotes statutes from twenty-three countries
that impose a duty to rescue and punish its breach by criminal sanctions.98
Russia's provision was first enacted in 1845, 99 Belgium's in 1961.100 All the
provisions require one who witnesses another in direct danger of his life to
at least call the authorities. Some demand much greater action. Norway,
a question posed by a lawyer about who should be considered a neighbor in the rule "love thy
neighbor." Throughout history, lawyers have apparently always been concerned with having an
indentifiable defendant.
93. Brief for Plaintiff at 6, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa. July 26, 1978).
94. STGB § 330(c), translated in Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans:A Comparative Survey
of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMp. L. 630, 655-56 (1966).
95. STGB § 13, translated in Fletcher, Criminal Omissions: Some Perspectives, 24 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 703 (1976) (brackets in original).
96. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. Feldbrugge, supra note 94, at 655-57.
99. Id. at 630.
100. Id. at 655.
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for example, requires action if the rescuer will suffer no "special danger or
sacrifice."' 0' 1
Professor Feldbrugge notes that there is "a fairly general consensus
that failure to rescue is an offense which can only be committed
intentionally."'' 0 2 This means that the offender knew "that somebody was
in specific danger, that he was able to help, and that this help would not
entail specific danger to himself. .*..,, In almost all countries, one who
innocently causes a traffic accident is bound to stop and render aid. t°M
Feldbrugge states that the reason seems to be that"the person is designated
by the circumstances, in a given situation, as the most suitable person upon
whom a duty to give aid can be imposed."'0 5 This is exactly the reasoning
underlying the operation of the construct, except that the defendant/
donor is the only person upon whom the duty can be imposed to any avail,
and the circumstances themselves give rise to the special relationship.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the achievement of a law in harmony
with morals'0 6 in this area is the principle, most rigidly applied through the
doctrine of stare decisis, that the law should be stable and predictable, not
given to rapid or capricious changes. While this concern is certainly valid,
especially since the law establishes rights and obligations that might affect
the conduct of one's affairs, 10 7 rigid application of the principle can lead to
serious injustices. Decisions regarding the course of the law should be
made by reasoned analysis of the arguments on both sides, not merely on
the basis of such traditional theories as the distinction between action and
inaction.'0°
101. Norwegian Crim. Code, art. 387, states:
Punishment by fines or imprisonment up to three months shall be imposed upon
anybody who omits, although it was possible for him without any special danger or sacrifice
to himself or others,
(1) to help according to his ability a person whose life is in obvious and imminent danger,
or
(2) to prevent, by timely report to the proper authorities or otherwise according to his
ability, fire, flood, explosion or similar accident, which may endanger human lives.
If anybody dies due to the misdemeanor, imprisonment up to six months may be
imposed.
Feldbrugge, supra note 94, at 656.
102. Id. at 641.
103. Id. at 641-42.
104. Id. at 650 n.69.
105. Id. at 650.
106. See note 78 supra.
107.
The rule of stare decisis is a rule of policy grounded on the theory that when a legal principle is
accepted and established, rights may accrue under it and security and certainty require that
the principle be recognized and followed thereafter even though it later be found to be not
legally sound.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 513, 8 N.W.2d 599, 607 (1943).
108. See text accompanying note 79 supra. We would do well to heed the advice of Lord
Denning, who wrote: "What is the argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has been found in
which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do
anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere." LORD DE.M.iNG, TIM
DIScIPLINE OF THE LAW, quoted in Lord Denning, 80, Master of the Rolls, Nat'l L. J., January 29,1979,
at 21.
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B. Constitutional Perspectives
The states must be assured that they can adopt the construct's limited
and special duty to rescue without running afoul of the United States
Constitution. As Judge Flaherty noted in MeFall, "[flor our law to compel
the defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every
concept and principle upon which our society was founded."'0 9 The
following analysis will show that the Constitution, the embodiment of
those concepts and principles, does not require that the state stand idly by
in these cases.
Since there are no cases that deal directly11° with coercive measures
designed to compel donation of body tissues, analogies must be drawn
from related cases dealing with the same basic issue: whether a state may
exert its power for the purpose of compelling a citizen to provide all or part
of his body in order to save the life of another. The Supreme Court,
deciding the only cases that have presented this issue-the abortion
cases-has held that the state may indeed exert such compulsion in accord
with constitutional guidelines.
In Roe v. Wade.. the Court stated that in certain circumstances the
state's interest in preserving the "potentiality of human life", 2 justifies the
proscription of abortion, thereby forcing the pregnant woman to provide
her body to sustain the fetus she carries. This analysis will examine the
doctrines and reasoning employed in Roe and apply them by analogy to
the operation of the construct.
Roe challenged a Texas statute" 3 proscribing all abortions except
those determined upon medical consultation to be necessary for the
preservation of the life of the mother. The Court assigned relative weights
to the individual rights and state interests implicated at different times
during pregnancy, balanced these rights and interests, and ruled the Texas
statute unconstitutional. The opinion is especially important to the
analysis here because the Roe Court determined the priority of the rights
and interests at specifically identified times.
This analysis is grounded in an analogy drawn between the period of
human existence examined by the Court in Roe and the period of human
existence in which the construct would operate. Individual human
existence begins upon the joinder of sperm and ovum and continues only
as long as the trillions of cells generated by thatjoinder are able to function
109. No. 78-17711 at 2 (emphasis in original).
110. The cases that concern donation of organs by minors and incompetents serve as
background; but because they do not deal with lack of consent and express refusal, they are of little
value for the present analysis. See generally Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Curran,
supra note 22.
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. Id. at 164.
113. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 1191-94, 1196 (Vernon 1961). When Texas adopted a new
criminal code in 1973, prior to the Court's decision in Roe, these sections were transferred to Tux,
HEALTH CODE ANN. tit. 71, §§ 4512.1-.4, 4512.6 (Vernon Supp. 1974-1975). See 410 U.S. at 117-118,
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synchronously. The totality of existence may be represented by a line,14
that has as its endpoints the moments of conception, C, and death, D."5
In Roe, the Court examined a segment of this line, the gestational
period, which has as its endpoints the moments of conception, C, and
birth, B.' 6 The construct is concerned with another segment of the line, the
dying period, which is bounded by the moments of affliction, A, and death,
D.!I1 Affliction refers to that point at which the plaintiff/patient first
contracts the disease that will eventually threaten his life." 8
The analysis that follows will focus on similarities and differences
between the line segments CB'and A-D." 9 Relying on the Court's opinion
in Roe,'" the writer will use these comparisons to assess the probable
constitutionality of the construct.
1. The Gestational Period
The Roe opinion recognized two points lying on the line segment L'
that are significant to a constitutional analysis: the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy, T; and the point at which the fetus becomes viable, V. The
end of the first trimester is uniform in all pregnancies, occurring, as a
matter of definition, three months after conception. The point at which the
fetus becomes viable, however, is not susceptible to uniform placement in
the time period, or on the segment -. The Roe opinion defined it as that
point at which the fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb.'' It has subsequently been defined as the
point at which, "in the judgment of the attending physician on the facts of
the particular case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus'
114. The use of the term "line" is technically improper since a line does not have endpoints but is
of infinite length. In order to minimize confusion, however, it is used here in contrast with what will
subsequently be referred to as "line segments."
115. The Roe court intimates that conception may not be a moment at all, but a process. 410
U.S. at 161. The same may be said ofdeath. The scientific niceties are unimportant in this context, since
precise determination of either concept is not required.
For convenience, italicized capitals are used to replace the terms they symbolize. The line






118. Affliction may occur during the gestational period, as in the case of some birth defects, or
even at the point of conception, as in the case of some hereditary disorders. The geometric
representations will nevertheless treat the two segments as distinct.
119. Line segments will be represented in the text by their cndpoints. Thus CBis theline segment
representing the period from conception to birth, AD representing the period from affliction to death.
120. The analysis is based primarily on Roe, although it will refer to other abortion cases. It
should be noted that the Roe Court's attention was called to the similarities between state authority to
proscribe abortions and state authority to require donation of blood and other body tissue. See Briefof
Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named Women in Support ofAppellants in Each Case at
21, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 639, 669 (1975).
121. 410 U.S. at 163.
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sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support,' 22
The segment Z is thus divided into three smaller segments, conception to
the end of the first trimester, CT, the end of the first trimester to viability,
TV- and viability to birth, - 123
The Court identified three parties and their respective interests during
the gestational period: (1) the pregnant woman, claiming rights of privacy
and control over her own body; (2) the fetus, for whom others claim on its
behalf an ill-defined constitutional "right to life"; 124 and (3) the state,
claiming an interest in the protection of the other two parties.
The Court found that the pregnant woman possessed a fundamental
right to privacy, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, that was
"broad enough to encompass her decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."1 25 The Court went on to caution, however, that "[tihe
pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy"; 26 that "this
right . . . must be considered against important state interests in
regulation."'1
27
The Court found important and legitimate state interests in the
preservation and protection of both maternal health and potential human
life: "These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality
as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each
becomes 'compelling.' ,,128 At the point at which these interests of the state
rise to the "compelling" level, the state isjustified in limiting the exercise of
the woman's fundamental right through regulation of the abortion
process. 12
9
The third party of concern to the Court was the fetus. As noted above,
the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the fetus as a "potentiality
of human life,"' 3 but it was necessary to determine whether the fetus was
guaranteed protection in its own right under the fourteenth amendment.
The Court and the litigants were acutely aware of the crucial nature of this
determination, since, if the fetus were protected, its "right to life would
then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."'131
122. Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 682 (1979). See also note 175 infra.
123. Represented:
I I I I
C T T V V B
124. Numerous amici curiae briefs were presented to the Court in support of fetal rights to life
under the Constitution.
125. 410 U.S. at 153.
126. Id. at 159.
127. Id. at 154.
128. Id. at 162-63.
129. Id. at 155. These regulations must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake." Id.
130. Id. at 164.
131. Id. at 157. Indeed, at one point in oral arguments the state's attorney argued to the Court:
"Gentlemen, we feel that the concept of a fetus being within the concept of a person, within the
framework of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution, is an extremely fundamental
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The Court held, after closely examining the use of the word "person"
elsewhere in the Constitution, that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."' 32 At no point
during the course of pregnancy, then, could the fetus, or one acting on its
behalf,133 assert a right that would circumscribe in any manner the
woman's exercise of her fundamental right to choose whether to terminate
her pregnancy.
The Court then proceeded to weigh the respective interests at various
stages of the pregnancy. During the first trimester, CT, the Court held that
the decision regarding termination of the pregnancy rested solely with the
woman and her physician 134 and that the state was not justified in any
attempts to abridge the exercise of the woman's fundamental right.'
35
During the second stage of pregnancy, from the end of the first
trimester to the point of fetal viability, TV, the Court found the state's
interest in maternal health sufficiently compelling to justify state regula-
tion of the abortion procedure "to the extent that the regulation reason-
ably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 36
During the final stage of pregnancy, extending from viability to birth,
VB, the Court found the state's interest in the preservation of potential life
compelling enough to justify complete proscription of abortion "except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."'
137
In summary, the Court found no compelling state interest during the
segment C-T, meaning that the woman is afforded free exercise 38 of her
fundamental right to choose whether to continue her pregnancy. During
the segment TV, the state may circumscribe the exercise of this right upon a
thing." To this statement, the Court replied: "Of course. if you're right about that, you can sit down,
you've won your case." 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OFTIIE SUPRFME COURT OFTIE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 822 (1975).
132. 410 U.S. at 158.
133. It is important to note that the state's interest in protecting the "potentiality of human life"
falls within the authority of the state to promote and protect the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of the community. It is not a derivative interest grounded in the doctrine ofparenspatriae
through which the state exercises its "sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1269 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
134. The Court notes: "The State may define the term'physician' ... to mean only a physician
currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion bya person who is not a physician as so
defined." 410 U.S. at 165. This is clearly an example of state regulation of the abortion process even
during the first trimester. The Court did not feel obligated to expose the compelling interest that
justified this regulation, but it seems clearly to be the protection of maternal health through proscribing
the unauthorized practice of medicine.
135. The Court appears prepared to allow some procedural regulation of the process throughout
the time segment CB. For all abortions, the Court has upheld reporting and recordkeeping procedures
that are "reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and ... properly respect a
patient's confidentiality and privacy. . . ." Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 80 (1976). The Court also appears to have upheld state authority to condition the availability of
abortion to a minor upon obtaining either parental consent or an order from a court of competent
jurisdiction, as long as the procedure for obtaining the order is not unduly burdensome. Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
136. 410 U.S. at 163.
137. Id. at 164.
138. But see notes 134 & 135 supra.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
showing that the circumscription is reasonably related to maternal health.
During the segment VB, the state, in protecting its interest in potential
human life, may proscribe all abortions except those necessary to preserve
maternal life or health. While the fundamental nature of the pregnant
woman's right never changes, the state may constitutionally compel her to
forego the exercise of that right and to provide her body for the benefit of
the fetus, which is itself without constitutional rights.39
2. The Dying Period
The Court has recognized the existence of two points, Tand V, on the
segment CB that are significant for evaluation of abortion statutes.
Similarly, on the segment affliction to death, AD, there are two points at
which, under the construct, the weights assigned the interests of the parties
cause a shift in the balance. These points are labelled reversible, R, and
irreversible, L140
Location of these points is accomplished by applying the criteria of
the construct to the individual case. Reversibility, R, and irreversibility, I,
serve as the endpoints for the segment R1, the stage during which the
plaintiff/patient is able to make a successful showing under the construct
and thus obtain relief. In the stages represented by the segments lying to the
left and right of Rlthe criteria for relief will not be satisfied. During the
stage affliction to reversibility, AR, for example, the plaintiff/patient will
not be able to show sufficient "imminence" of death to entitle him to
relief.'4 ' During the stage irreversibility to death, ID, on the other hand, he
will not be able to show a sufficiently substantial benefit to justify the
transplant. 1
42
N, then, is the only stage in which the construct would operate and is
the segment that requires constitutional analysis. It remains to identify the
segment of the gestational period that is the best analogue to Nand to use
the Roe analysis of that segment to determine the constitutionality of the
construct.
The parties involved in the dying period are: (1) the defendant/donor;
(2) the state; and (3) the plaintiff/patient. These correspond, respectively,
to: (1) the pregnant woman; (2) the state; and (3) the gestating fetus.
The defendant/donor has, throughout the dying period, a fundamen-
tal right to bodily security143 similar to the pregnant woman's right to
139. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
140. Thus, the segment AD may be subdivided into three segments, AR, RI, and ID,
represented:
g I i II
A R R I I D
141. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 51, 52 supra.
143. "The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of
his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." I W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMnNrAai s * 129.
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privacy. The question of infringement of this right, which may be
compared with the pregnant woman's right to privacy, is addressed
below.
44
The state has an interest in the life of the plaintiff/ patient similar to its
interest in "the potentiality of human life."' 45 The two interests are
nevertheless distinct: the plaintiff/ patient is unquestionably a "person"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, while the fetus is not.
146
The ramifications of this distinction are discussed below.1
47
The constitutional "personhood" of the plaintiff/ patient would seem
to indicate, in the language of Roe, that his "right to life [is] guaranteed
specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment."' 48 This significantly
strengthens the claim of a state interest in his life 49 and provides the bisis
upon which he can bring a suit on his own behalf. If the sanctions under the
construct are civil only, it would be necessary for the plaintiff/ patient in
the original equitable action to establish, as a matter of standing, that his
personal rights were being infringed upon by the defendant/donor's
refusal to cooperate in the transplant procedure.1
50
3. The Analysis
The state, by providing a means to implement the construct, infringes
upon the fundamental right of the defendant/ donor in order to protect its
interest in the life of the plaintiff/ patient. As pointed out above, this
infringement only occurs during the.stage of the dying period that is
represented by N-. In order to find a gestational analogue for R, the
circumstances of the parties and the disease must be compared with the
circumstances delineated in Roe. The greater the similarity of R/to VB,
viability to birth, the more probable that the construct comports with the
Constitution, for it is only for the period VB that the Roe Court upheld the
right of the state to infringe upon one person's fundamental right in order
to assert its interest in the protection of another.
144. See text accompanying notes 180-97 infra.
145. 410 U.S. at 164.
146. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 153-57 infra.
148. 410 U.S. at 157.
149. If the Court's rather offhand language regarding the specific guarantee of a right to life is
taken literally, an argument could be made that the fourteenth amendment places an affirmative
obligation on the states to protect their citizens.This would be consonant with some political theorists'
views of the function of the state. If men first banded together to protect themselves from external
enemies and the state later assumed the role of protecting them from internal dangers by enacting
criminal laws, the state should guard against all natural dangers, including disease. The United States
government has certainly afforded economic protection through its social welfare programs and
research and treatment grants. If the duty is recognized in economic terms, and if the government is
within constitutional limits in enacting this proposed form of protection from natural forces, the
affirmative state obligation argument would seem to have some validity.
150. "The question of standing . . . concerns ... the question whethertheinterestsoughtto
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs. Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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The situation of the plaintiff/patient during RI is analogous to the
situation of the fetus during the whole course of pregnancy. Both are
dependent on another for their continued existence. The plaintiff/patient
is in need of bodily tissue from the defendant/donor; the fetus is in need of
the nutrients and oxygen being passed to it from the mother through the
placenta. 15
If RIis to be found meaningfully similar to VB, it must be shown that
the situations of either the state or the mother and the defendant/donor are
different during RI and VB than during the remainder of the dying and
gestational periods. As noted above, the fundamental quality of the right
possessed by the pregnant woman does not change, 52 nor does its
analogue possessed by the defendant/donor. Therefore, a distinction
between the various stages of the gestational period or between the various
stages of the dying period cannot be based on differences in the situations
of the pregnant woman or the defendant/donor during those stages.
The state's posture during viability to birth, VB, differs from its
posture at all other times during the gestational period. The Court has been
quite careful in avoiding an objective standard to be applied in determining
viability. It has said that viability is the point at which the fetus is
presumably capable of a meaningful life153 and stands a reasornable
likelihood of survival outside the mother's womb. 54 Why the hesitancy on
the part of the Court to allow an arbitrary standard? Not because a viable
fetus achieves protectable rights. 55 It is because viability signifies the
attainment by the fetus of a sufficient "potentiality of human life"'156 that
the state becomes justifiably concerned about its protection and
preservation. Earlier in gestation, during the period 'V, when the
potential of human life is not as strong, the state's interest is simply not
compelling.
The plaintiff/patient, however, is not simply potential: he is a living
human being. Therefore, the state has a legitimate and important interest
in the preservation of his life. Under the construct, the assertion of the
state's interest is properly deferred until the period RTbecause that interest
is not "compelling" when the plaintiff/patient's life is not in imminent
danger or when the infringement of the defendant/ donor's right is unlikely
to yield substantial benefit to the plaintiff/patient. It is the interest of the
state, then, that distinguishes R-and V'fffrom the other segments and that
justifies their use as analogues in this analysis. 57
151. Interruption of this flow has been compared to" 'cutting the air hose on a salvage diver,''
Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4, 27 (Mass. 1976) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting).
152. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
153. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
154. Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 682 (1979).
155. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
157. The analogy becomes more clear when the state interest is diagrammed. The "state interest"
curve during the gestational period is represented:
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But what of the differences? Surely the defendant/ donor almost never
bears responsibility for the condition of the plaintiff/patient, in contrast to
the pregnant woman who ordinarily 15 may be charged with responsibility
for the existence of the fetus. To require a person to abstain from harming
another is wholly different from requiring that a positive benefit be
conferred. Furthermore, there may be greater risks in donating certain
bodily tissues than in bearing a child.
These distinctions'5 9 deserve consideration. The first, the responsibili-
ty of the person whose right is infringed for the condition of the other, is the
most troublesome. In most cases, the pregnant woman has deliberately
engaged in the sexual intercourse that resulted in the existence of the fetus.
In most cases, the defendant/donor will have had no part in the
plaintiff/ patient's contraction of the disease.160 One of the great notions of
our law is that everyone must take responsibility for the proximate results
of his acts; one acts at his own peril.161 The woman's deliberate
participation in coitus imposes upon her the duty to accept the
consequences of the act, and it is therefore not "unfair" to require her to
lend her body to the viable fetus.
Such arguments may buttress one's personal opinions on abortion,
but it is wrong to ascribe constitutional validity to them on the basis of
Roe. First, it is a recognized fact that pregnancies result not only from
compelling
C T V B
The "state interest" curve during the dying period is represented:
compelling - I Ill
A R I D
Thus, the analogy arises because only during the periods VB and RI is the state interest compelling.
158. In cases of rape or seduction of an incompetent, of course, few would hold the woman
chargeable with the results of the act. See text accompanying notes 160-64 infra.
159. This incomplete list of distinctions includes those that were most often expressed to the
writer.
160. Indeed, if he did have a part-e.g., through transmission of a contagious disease-his duty
to aid might arise from the doctrine that those who negligently injure anotherare under aduty to render
aid to those injured. See REsAEmmrae, (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321, 322 (1965).
161. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
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loving embraces but also from forcible intercourse. Although the Roe
Court was well aware that many abortion statutes in existence at the time
permitted abortions in cases of pregnancies resulting from rape, 162 its
opinion does not accord any special rights in this situation. Presumably, a
rape victim carrying a viable fetus could be required to show that an
abortion was "necessary to preserve [her] life or health,' 63 in spite of the
fact that she bears no responsibility for the pregnancy.1 64
More fundamentally, the comparative responsibility argument is
simply not supported by the Court's opinion in Roe. The Court took notice
of three justifications for criminal abortion statutes: (1) deterrence of
"illicit sexual conduct"165; (2) concern over the safety of the procedure
itself; 66 and (3) exercise of the "state's interest-some call it a duty-in
protecting prenatal life."' 6 7 Each of these justifications was dealt with and
the Court's opinion was tailored to accomodate them. 168 Not once in the
opinion of the Court, nor in the concurring and dissenting opinions, is
there a mention of a "duty" or "responsibility" that the pregnant woman
owes as a result of her sexual conduct.
It is merely fortuitous that antiabortion statutes operate negatively to
forbid an action, while the transplantation construct requires a positive
act. In both instances, the state invades fundamental individual rights of
bodily autonomy in order to protect another. The pregnant woman is
compelled to keep within her body something that she does not want there;
the transplantation defendant/donor is compelled to relinquish from his
body something that he wants to retain.
162. The Court quoted the American Bar Association-approved Uniform Abortion Act that
allowed victims of rape to secure abortions even after the generally applicable maximum limit of 20
weeks had passed. 410 U.S. at 146-47 n.40. The Court also referred to the text of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code § 230.3(2), which exempted rape victims from the generalproscription of
abortions. 410 U.S. at 140 n.37. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,205-06 app. (1973). Tile Court noted
that fourteen states had adopted some form of the ALI statute. 410 U.S. at 140 n.37.
163. 410 U.S. at 164.
164. The Court brought up this issue at oral argument:
Mr. Floyd [state's attorney]: Now the appellee does, not disagree with the appellant's
statement that a woman has a choice. But, as we have previously mentioned, we feel that this
choice is left up to the woman prior to the time she becomes pregnant. This is the time of the
choice ....
The Court: Texas doesn't grant any exemption in the case of a rape, where the woman's
pregnancy has resulted from rape-either statutory or otherwise--does it?
Mr. Floyd: There is nothing in our statute about that. Now the procedure-
The Court: And such a woman wouldn't have had a choice, would she?
Mr. Floyd: . . . [A]s I understand the procedure when a woman is brought in after a rape, is
to try to stop whatever has occurred, immediately, by the proper procedure in a
hospital ....
75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TIlE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 805 (1975).
165. 410 U.S. at 148.
166. Id. at 148-50.
167. Id. at 150.
168. The first was summarily dismissed by the Court because Texas did not offer It in defense of
the statute and because it would have presented serious problems of overbreadth. Id. at 148. The other
two justifications were recognized by the Court as interests in maternal health and potential human life,
and dealt with as they arose during the gestational period. Id. at 148.52.
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The difference in risks to be faced by the defendant/donor and the
pregnant woman are difficult to quantify. The construct limits the risks
faced by a defendant/ donor, 69 but there is no authoritative articulation of
the risks that must be faced by the pregnant woman during the period VB.
The closest case on point is United States v. Vuitch,170 decided before Roe,
in which the Court construed a District of Columbia statute proscribing all
abortions except those necessary to save the life or health of the mother. 7'
The Court used Webster's Dictionary to determine that the word "health"
included mental as well as physical health: A" '[s]tate of being... sound
in body [or] mind.' , 72 The Court noted that the medical decision whether
a particular procedure is necessary for the patient's health is routine.1
3
Justice Douglas, dissenting, pointed out that a physician must nevertheless
be aware that he is always vulnerable to criminal prosecution in which a
jury may second-guess his "routine" decision. 74 The Court seems willing
to reduce this vulnerability,1 5 but cautious physicians are unlikely to
perform a late-term abortion unless the risks to the woman are clear.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court's reasoning in
Roe does not invalidate the construct. Indeed, Roe can be invoked for its
positive support. The state's interest in protecting the life of the
plaintiff/ patient is even stronger than its interest in protecting potential life
because the plaintiff/patient has legally cognizable rights under the
Constitution. Morever, unlike the so-called "viable" fetus, whose likely
chance of survival 176 can be preserved even upon deliberate removal from
the uterine environment, 77 the plainfiff/patient is in imminent danger of
death 78 if the court allows the defendant/donor to stand firm on his
claimed constitutional rights.
Under the construct, the defendant/ donor is afforded all protections
reasonably appropriate to safeguard his interests, and it is only after a
court of competent jurisdiction has considered evidence from attending
physicians that there is any encroachment upon his rights. The right of the
169. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
170. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
171. D.C. CODE § 22-201 (1973).
172. 402 U.S. at 72. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1043 (1966).
173. 402 U.S. at72.
174. Id. at 75.
175. See Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675 (1979). The Colautti Court held invalid a
Pennsylvania abortion statute that required the attending physician to use the abortion procedure
most likely to result in a live birth "if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." 35
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977). The Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague,
saying that "a statute imposing strict civil and criminal liability for an erroneous determination of
viability, could have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions
near the point of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical judgment." 99 S. Ct. at 686.
176. 99 S. Ct. at 682.
177. A hysterotomy procedure, similar to a Caesarean section, is available and is the method of
choice for late term abortions. This procedure would provide the best chance of live birth, since the
fetus is not necessarily injured during the procedure. 4B R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'STEXBOOK OF MEDICINE
311.54(2) (3d ed. 1979).
178. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
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defendant/ donor to bodily security, like the right of a pregnant woman to
privacy, is not absolute.
4. The Defendant/Donor's Claim to Bodily Security
Mr. Shimp contended that his "right to himself [choose] whether his
body will be invaded for the benefit of another is fundamental and beyond
question. The decision of whether to be a donor is that of the Defendant
and the Defendant alone." 7 9 Similar assertions regarding the existence of
an absolute right to the control of one's own body were made in Roe. It was
urged upon the Court that few rights could be considered "more basic,
fundamental or worthy of protection than a woman's right to control her
body and the nature, direction and quality of her life."'' 0 The Court was
asked to recognize that "[t/he freedom to be the master of her own body,
and thus of her own fate, is as fundamental a right as a woman can
possess." 181
The Roe Court was unimpressed. Justice Blackmun wrote:
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amicithat one has an un-
limited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to
the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind iii the past. Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) (sterilization).18 2
That the Court chose Jacobson and Buck to support its decision
provides insight into its reasoning in Roe. The legislative enactments in
Jacobson and Buck were upheld as legitimate exercises of the state's police
power. By inference, state restriction of the right of a pregnant woman to
an abortion is an exercise of police power.'83 Likewise, under the
construct, interference with the defendant/donor's right to bodily security
is also an exercise of police power.
The defendant in Jacobson v. Massachusetts84 claimed that the
state's compulsory smallpox vaccination law was
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent
right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to
179. Brief for Defendant at 4, McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711 In Equity (C.P. Allegheny
County, Pa. July 26, 1978).
180. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion
Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition at 16,75 LANDMARK BmEFS AND AROUMENTS Op Til
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 563, 594 (1975).
181. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The American
Psychiatric Association, The American Medical Women's Association, The New York Academy of
Medicine, and a Group of 178 Physicians as Amici Curiae at 16, 75 LANDMARK BRIE:S AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317, 347 (1975).
182. 410 U.S. at 154.
183. "[A] state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining
medical standards, and in protecting potential life." Id.
184. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects
to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon
his person.
185
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, denied that the law could be so
characterized, since
the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be,
at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. . . "The
possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable
conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country
essential to safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community.
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will. .. .
At issue in Buck v. Bell 87 was the constitutionality of a Virginia
statute that authorized selective sterilization of mental incompetents. The
incompetent pressing the claim, Carrie Buck, was the daughter of a"feeble
minded mother . . . and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded
child."' 8 The state court that originally issued the sterilization order found
that she was " 'the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring, likewise afflicted, that she [could be] sexually sterilized without
detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that of society
[would be] promoted by her sterilization.' ,,189
Carrie Buck urged the Court that the statute was unconstitutional
because it violated her "right of bodily integrity and [was] therefore
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"90 and
denied her equal protection of the laws.' 9' The Court, speaking through
Justice Holmes, was unpersuaded:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned .... The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes ....
Jacobson and Buck exemplify judicial balancing of rights and
interests when an important exercise of the police power conflicts with a
citizen's right to bodily security.19 3 In Jacobson and Buck, as in Roe,
185. Id. at 26.
186. Id. at 26-27 (citing Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
187. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
188. Id. at 205.
189. Id. at 207.
190. Id. at 201.
191. Id. at 202.
192. Id. at 207.
193. This type of balancing test can also be found incriminal searchand scizurecases, anarcain
which the courts have increasingly subordinated a suspect's right to bodily integrity to the need for
effective law enforcement. The movement began with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). in which the
1979]
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skilled rhetoricians unsuccessfully pressed upon the Court emotional
arguments designed to narrow the focus of the cases to the fundamental
right of bodily security. In McFall v. Shimp, the rhetoric worked. 94 The
court acknowledged defendant's assertion of his right to bodily security as
an insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs demand. The court was unable to
articulate a doctrine that would appropriately allow the state 95 to assert its
interest. This ruling, probably proper under the present state of the law, 196
failed to deal effectively with the defendant's clearly defective claim of an
absolute right to bodily security. 97
IV. CONCLUSION
Our system of law must confront the issues presented by rapidly
developing biomedical technology. McFall v. Shimp was not unique in
presenting profound ethical and scientific issues that are difficult for a
court to decide fairly under traditional rules of American law. 98 The writer
has proposed a construct to guide the just resolution of one such issue:
compulsion of an unwilling donor in a transplantation that would
significantly prolong the life of a donee who otherwise faces imminent
death. The analysis offered to support the construct will allow
accomplishment of justice without heightening the emotions that are
necessarily aroused when fundamental rights are in conflict. The title of
this article asks whether we, as members of a moral society experiencing
explosive technological growth, can live with the result of McFal v.
Shimp. This writer respectfully submits that our answer to that query, as it
was for Robert McFall, must be in the negative.
Fordham E. Huffman
Court held lawful a policeman's "stop-and-frisk" search of a suspect who" 'didn't look right to [the
policeman] at the time."' Id. at 5. The subordination apparently reached its zenith in United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). In Crowder, the trial
court ordered the surgical removal of a bullet from a criminal defendant, upon a showing that the bullet
was likely to prove that the defendant took part in a murder. For an extensive annotation on physical
invasion of i person's body for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution, see
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d (1952), and the cases compiled in the Later Case Service under that annotation,
194. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
195. Judge Flaherty recognized that McFall's request required state action. He phrased Ills
opinion in terms of the "Chancellor" being asked to do something, anid the "law" being asked to compel
the donation. No. 78-17711 at 2. He viewed the requested intervention of the state, however, as being in
aid of the plaintifis exercise of his rights when, in fact, MeFall was asking the court to vindicate the
state's interests. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
196. Pennsylvania had imposed no statutory duty to rescue, and Judge Flaherty was properly
hesitant about creating a common-law duty without guidance from lhe legislature.
197. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Judge Flaherty's language in the opinion
demonstrates his overly protective concern for the defendant, in spite of the fact that he found Shimp's
conduct to be morally unacceptable. His concern was unnecessary in view of the Court's
pronouncements concerning the right asserted.
198. The law is an important means by which society ensures that implementation of
technological advances takes place only after careful consideration of the consequences, The recent
court decisions in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) ("right to die") and Superintendant of
Belchertown State School v. Sackewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (right to refuse medical
treatment) are clear examples; more may be expected as biomedical technology develops.
